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Abstract
We present a complete characterization of the classical transfer problem for an exchange
economy with an arbitrary finite number of traders. Our method is geometric, using an
equilibrium manifold developed by Debreu, Mas-Colell, and Balasko. We show that for a
regular equilibrium the transfer problem arises if and only if the index at the equilibrium
is −1. This implies that the transfer problem does not happen if the equilibrium is Walras
tatonnement stable. Our result generalizes Balasko’s analogous result for an exchange
economy with two traders.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the following classical transfer problem (Samuelson, 1952, 1954):
Problem 1.1. Suppose that in the world there are n countries trading l goods where n and l
are arbitrary natural numbers. Then does it happen that after a country, say country A, gives
away some of her endowment to other countries, country A’s utility level goes up? If it happens,
characterize it.
Samuelson considered an exchange economy with n = 2 and l = 2 (with or without various
trade impediments). He also hinted that (without proof) the transfer problem is closely related
to the economic stability. Balasko verified that Samuelson’s intuition was correct. He showed
that in a smooth exchange economy (without any trade impediments) the tranfer problem arises
at a regular equilibrium if and only if the index at the equilibrium is −1, in other words, this
pathology happens only when the equilibrium is locally Walras tatonnement unstable. Using
the theory of equilibrium manifold, Balasko initially showed this for n = 2 and l = 2 (Balasko,
1978), then for n = 2 and an arbitrary finite number l (Balasko, 2014).
The main purpose of this paper is to extend Balasko’s result for arbitrary finite numbers n
and l. Roughly speaking, we show that
Theorem 1.2. For a smooth exchange economy with arbitrary finite numbers of traders (coun-
tries) and goods (without any trade impediments), the transfer problem arises at a regular
equilibrium if and only if the index at the equilibrium is −1. In particular, the transfer problem
arises only when the regular equilibrium is locally Walras tatonnement unstable.
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For the precise formulation of the transfer problem, see Definition 3.2. Our model suits
better than Balasko’s model to the current world economy where many countries (insted of just
2 countries) trade large amount of goods. We do not consider any trade impediments. This
simplifies our model, and also this is a reasonable assumption considering that various trade
impediments have become negligible in the modern global world economy. Some might disagree
with us: we leave the issue about trade costs for a future work.
Our approach is (differential) geometric: we use the theory of equilibriummanifold in (Debreu,
1970), (Mas-Colell, 1985), (Balasko, 2009, 2011). We restrict our equilibrium analysis to the
set of regular equilibria. This is not a strong assumption: the set of regular equilibria is an
open subset with the full measure in an equilibrium manifold (Balasko, 2011, Prop. 8.10).
We kept the mathematical requirement minimum. Readers just need to know basic differ-
ential geometry (or differential topology), say, Milnor’s little book (Milnor, 1965) or Guillemin-
Pollack’s classic (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974) is more than enough. (Actually just knowing the
definition of a differentiable manifold and the statement of the transversality theorem suffices.)
All necessary backgrounds on equilibrium manifolds, economic stability, and the index theo-
rem are contained in the paper. Our references for general equilibrium theory and equilibrium
manifolds are (Balasko, 2009, 2011) and (Mas-Colell, 1985).
Here is the structure of the paper. In Section 2, we set out notation and explain our economic
model. Then in Section 3, we review the theory of equilibrium manifold and formulate the
transfer problem in a precise way. In Section 4, we quickly review the relationship between
economic stability and the index theorem. In Section 5, we thoroughly analyse our model and
prove a key result Proposition 5.1. Then in Section 6, we apply all results from previous sections
to prove the main result Theorem 6.1. Finally in Section 7, we state several open problems.
2 An exchange economy
We denote by N, R, and R>0 the set of natural numbers, the set of real numbers, and the set
of positive real numbers respectively. Fix l ∈ N. We set the commodity space X := Rl>0 (the
strictly positive orthant of Rl). We set the l-th goods as a a numeraire: if p = (p1, · · · , pl) ∈ X
is a price vector, then pl = 1. We assume that all prices are strictly positive. The set of price
vectors is S := Rl−1>0 × {1}. We have n ∈ N traders (countries). Each trader i ∈ {1, · · · , n} is
endowed with a goods vector ωi ∈ X . We assume that our economy is an exchange economy
with no production: the total resources r =
∑n
i=1 ωi of the economy is fixed. We write Ω =
{ω = (ω1, · · · , ωn) ∈ X
n |
∑n
i=1 ωi = r} for the space of endowment of the economy.
We assume that each trader’s preferences is represented by a smooth utility function ui :
X → R. For zi ∈ X , we write Izi := {yi ∈ X | ui(yi) = ui(zi)} (the indifference surface for
trader i going through the point zi). We assume that each ui satisfies the following standard
hypotheses for the differential equilibrium analysis (Mas-Colell, 1985), (Balasko, 2009). For
any xi ∈ X , (i) smooth monotonicity: Dui(xi) ∈ Rl>0; (ii) smooth strict quasi-concavity:
the Hessian D2ui(xi) is negative definite on the tangent plane to Ixi ; (iii) Ixi is closed in X .
Moreover, we extend ui to xi = 0 by setting ui(0) = infxi∈Xui(xi).
Given a price vector p ∈ S and an budget wi = p · ωi ∈ R>0, each trader maximizes the
utility ui(xi) under the budget constraint p · xi ≤ wi. Then there exists a unique solution to
this utility maximization problem, and we obtain a smooth demand function fi : S×R>0 → X
satisfying Walras’s law: p · fi(p, wi) = wi. Note: Do not confuse wi with ωi. We are following
Debreu’s (and Balasko’s) notation (Debreu, 1970), (Balasko, 2014).
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3 The equilibrium manifold
For p ∈ S and ω ∈ Ω, let z(p, ω) :=
∑n
i=1 fi(p, p ·ωi)− r. Then z(p, ω) is the (social) excess
demand associated with (p, ω). It is clear that the function z : S ×X → Rl is smooth.
Definition 3.1. We call (p, ω) ∈ S×X is an equilibrium if z(p, ω) = 0. The subset E of S×Ω
defined by z(p, ω) = 0 is called the equilibrium manifold.
Note that the equilibrium manifold E is a real smooth manifold in the usual sense in differ-
ential geometry (Milnor, 1965), (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974). See (Balasko, 2009, Prop. 2.4.1)
for a proof.
For (p, ω) ∈ S × X , we denote by z−l(p, ω) ∈ Rl−1 the vector defined by the first l − 1
components of z(p, ω). Since each trader satisfies Walras’ law at an equilibrium, we have
z(p, ω) = 0 if and only if z−l(p, ω) = 0. (Thus it is enough to consider z−l(p, ω).) Let p ∈ S.
We write p−l for the vector defined by the first l-coordinates of p. (The l-th coordinate is fixed
by the numeraire assumption anyway.) Recall that an equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E is regular if the
Jacobian matrix J(p, ω) := Dz−l(p, ω)/Dp−l is invertible (Mas-Colell, 1985) (Balasko, 2009).
Suppose that (p, ω) ∈ E is a regular equilibrium. Then by applying the implicit function
theorem to the equation z−l(p, ω) = 0, we can express p in terms of ω. Then by (Balasko,
2011, Prop. 7.2), there exist a neighborhood U of ω, a neighborhood V of (p, ω), and a smooth
map s : U → S such that the map σ : U → V defined by σ(x) = (s(x), x) is a diffeomorphism
between U and V . Following (Balasko, 2014), we call σ (or s) the local equilibrium selection
map (the local equilibrium price selection map) associated with (p, ω). Now we are ready to
state the transfer problem in a precise way:
Definition 3.2. We say that there is a transfer problem at a regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E if
there exists an endowment vector ω′ ∈ U and a trader i ∈ {1, · · · , n} such that
1. ωi ≤ ω
′
i and ωi 6= ω
′
i,
2. ui(fi(s(ω
′), s(ω′) · ω′i)) > ui(fi(s(ω), s(ω) · ωi))
where s : U → S is the local equilibrium price selection map associated with (p, ω) defined
above.
Note that the definition of the transfer problem at (p, ω) ∈ E requires (p, ω) to be regular
(since otherwise we do not have the function s). However this is not a strong restriction: the
set of regular equilibria in E is open with the full measure of E; see (Balasko, 2011, Prop. 8.10).
4 Economic stability and the index theorem
In this short section, we review the definition of the index at an equilibrium (p, ω) and
its relationship with economic stability to make this paper self-contained. Our references here
are (Arrow and Hahn, 1971), (Hirsch et al., 2004), and (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974). Recall
that the index of a regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E is 1 (or −1) if the sign of (−1)l−1det(J(p, ω))
is positive (or negative respectively). It is well-known that if (p, ω) ∈ E is a Walras tatonnement
locally stable equilibrium, then all eigenvalues of J(p, ω) must have strictly negative real parts.
Thus the index of such (p, ω) ∈ E must be 1. Note that the converse fails: there exists an
equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E such that the index of (p, ω) is 1 but (p, ω) is not Walras tatonnement
locally stable. See the references above for more on this.
3
5 A geometric approach to equilibrium analysis
In this section, we follow the argument in (Balasko, 2014, Sec. 3) closely. Define the price-
income space H(r) associated with the fixed social endowment r by H(r) := {(p, w) ∈ S×Rn>0 |∑n
i=1 wi = p ·r} where w is the income vector (w1, · · · , wn). From the definition, it is clear that
H(r) is an (l+ n− 2)-dimensional hyperplane in S ×Rn>0. We set the coordinates for H(r) by
(p1, · · · , pl−1, w1, · · · , wn−1) = (p−l, w−n) ∈ R
l+n−2
>0 . Note that we omitted the last coordinate
of w since wn is determined by wn = p · r −
∑n−1
i=1 wi.
Let B(r) := {(p, w) ∈ H(r) |
∑n
i=1 fi(p, wi) = r}. We call B(r) the section manifold.
This is a smooth (n− 1)-dimensional submanifold of H(r) by (Balasko, 2009, Prop. 5.4.1). In
the following, we give a concrete parametrization of B(r) that comes handy for our geometric
equilibrium analysis.
Let P (r) be the set of Pareto optimal allocations. First, we parametrize P (r). Let U(r) be
the set of vectors (u1, · · · , un−1) = u−n ∈ Rn−1 of the first n− 1 traders’ feasible utility levels,
that is
U(r) :={u−n ∈ R
n−1 | there exists (x1, · · · , xn−1) ∈ X
n−1
such that u1 = u1(x1), · · · , un−1 = un−1(xn−1) and
n−1∑
i=1
xi ≤ r}.
Given u−n ∈ U(r) we obtain a Pareto optimal allocation x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ X
n by solving the
following constrained optimization problem:
max
x∈Xn
un(xn) subject to u−n = u−n(x−n) for some x−n ∈ U(r) and
n∑
i=1
xi = r.
We write x(u−n) = (x1(u−n), · · · , xn(u−n)) for the solution of this optimization problem.
Under our assumptions on smooth preferences, there exists a unique price vector p(u−n) ∈ S
that supports x(u−n). Note that p(u−n) is parallel to the gradiant vectors Dui(xi(u−n)). We
can express all Pareto optimal allocations as x(u−n) by varying u−n in U(r).
Here is a crucial observation: the point M(u−n) := (p(u−n), p(u−n) · x1(u−n), · · · , p(u−n) ·
xn(u−n)) ∈ H(r) belongs to B(r) for any u−n ∈ U(r). Conversely, any point (p, w) ∈ B(r) is
associated with a unique point u−n ∈ U(r) via u−n = (u1(f1(p, w1), · · · , un−1(fn−1(p, wn−1))).
Thus, u−n ∈ U(r) parametrizes the section manifold B(r) as well as the set of Pareto optimal
allocations P (r).
For the map M : U(r) → B(r), we write ∂M
∂ui
for the partial derivative of M with respect
to ui for i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}. We set a positive orientation for B(r) via (
∂M
∂u1
, · · · , ∂M
∂un−1
). For
u−n ∈ U(r), the vector
∂M
∂ui
(u−n) represents the direction of increasing the utility level for
trader i in a neighborhood of M(u−n).
For ω ∈ Ω, we define the budget space A(ω) associated with the endowment ω by A(ω) :=
{(p, w) ∈ H(r) | wi = p · ωi for i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}}. Then A(ω) is a linear space being the
intersection of hyperplanes defined by wi = p · ωi in the hyperplane H(r).
It is easy to see that (p, ω) ∈ S × Ω is an equilibrium if and only if (p, p · ω1, · · · , p · ωn) ∈
A(ω) ∩ B(r). The point is that we split the equilibrium analysis into the analysis of two
separate parts A(ω) and B(r). The first part A(ω) is a linear space. Thus all nonlinearities of
the equilibrium equation z(p, ω) = 0 is captured by B(r). Note that B(r) does not depend on
ω: all ω-terms are in A(ω).
Using the coordinate system (p−l, w−n) for H(r) and the equations wi = p · ωi, we see that
A(ω) is parallel to the (l − 1)-dimensional vector space whose basis {a1(ω), · · · , al−1(ω)} (in
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terms of this coordinate system) is given by
a1(ω) := (1, 0, · · · , 0, ω
1
1, ω
1
2 , · · · , ω
1
n−1),
a2(ω) := (0, 1, 0, · · · , 0, ω
2
1 , ω
2
2, · · · , ω
2
n−1),
· · ·
al−1(ω) := (0, · · · , 0, 1, ω
l−1
1 , ω
l−1
2 , · · · , ω
l−1
n−1),
where ωji is trader i’s endowment of goods j.
We set the positive orientation of A(ω) via (a1(ω), · · · , al−1(ω)). Clearly the set of vectors
ai(ω) is linearly independent, so the dimension of A(ω) is l − 1.
Pick a regular equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E. Then (p, p · ω1, · · · , p · ωn) is the corresponding
point in the price-income space H(r). Let ui(p, ω) := ui(fi(p, p · ωi)) for i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}.
Since (p, ω) is regular, smooth submanifolds A(ω) and B(r) of H(r) intersect transversally at
(p, p · ω1, · · · , p · ωn). By the celebrated transversality theorem (Mas-Colell, 1985, Chap.1.I),
this is equivalent to
∆(p, ω) := det
(
a1(ω), · · · , al−1(ω),
∂M
∂u1
(u−n(p, ω)), · · · ,
∂M
∂un−1
(u−n(p, ω))
)
6= 0.
Here is the main result of this section.
Proposition 5.1. Let (p, ω) ∈ E be regular. Then the index of (p, ω) is 1 (or −1) if ∆(p, ω)
is positive (or negative respectively).
Proof. Although we could prove the proposition by a (not illuminating) tedious direct com-
putation, we avoid it by utilizing the parametrization of B(r) via U(r) above. The following
argument shows that ∆(p, ω) has the opposite sign of J(p, ω) for any regular (p, ω) ∈ E, which
is sufficient for our purpose.
For u−n ∈ U(r). letM(u−n) = (p(u−n), w1(u−n), · · · , wn(u−n)) ∈ B(r). Now let ωi(u−n) :=
fi(p(u−n), wi(u−n)) for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, and write ω(u−n) for (ω1(u−n), · · · , ωn(u−n)). Then
(p(u−n), ω(u−n)) is a no-trade equilibrium. By (Balasko, 2011, Prop. 8.2) every no-trade equi-
librium is regular, so (p(u−n), ω(u−n)) is regular.
Note that A(ω(u−n)) varies continuously as u−n moves around in U(r). Thus the function
δ : U(r)→ R defined by δ(u−n) := ∆(p(u−n), ω(u−n)) is continuous. We see that δ never take
the value 0 for any u−n ∈ U(r) since every no-trade equilibrium is regular. So it is enough to
check the sign of δ for any particular value of u−n since U(r) is connected. (We are using the
same argument as in the proof of (Balasko, 2014, Lem. 1).)
Let ω = (0, 0, · · · , 0, r) ∈ Xn. Then u−n(ω) := (u1(0), u2(0), · · · , un−1(0)). Thus
∆ (p(u−n(ω)), ω) :=det
(
e1, e2, · · · , el−1,
∂M
∂u1
(u−n(ω)), · · · ,
∂M
∂un−1
(u−n(ω))
)
where ei is the column vector whose i-th coordinate is 1 and all other coordinates are zero.
Let ∆′ (p(u−n(ω)), ω) be the submatix of ∆ (p(u−n(ω)), ω) formed by the last (n− 1) rows
and columns of ∆ (p(u−n(ω)), ω). Then
δ(u−n(ω)) > 0 if and only if det (∆
′(p(u−n(ω)), ω)) > 0.
Note that the vector ∂M
∂ui
(u−n(ω)) for i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1} is the direction of increasing trader
i’s utility level holding other trader’s utility level fixed at uj(0) for all j ∈ {1, · · · , n− 1}\{i}.
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Since the income of all traders i ∈ {1, · · · , n− 1} is 0 at (p(u−n(ω)), ω), we must have
∂M
∂ui
(u−n(ω)) = (0, 0, · · · , 0, x, 0, · · · , 0) where x is the i-th component and x ∈ R>0.
Therefore we clearly have det (∆′(p(u−n(ω)), ω)) > 0, and we are done.
Remark 5.2. We have shown that the index at (p, ω) ∈ E is same as the intersection number of
A(ω) andB(r) at the corresponding point (p, p·ω1, · · · , p·ωn) ∈ H(r); see (Guillemin and Pollack,
1974, p.96) for the definition of the intersection number of two smooth manifolds.
6 The transfer problem
Let i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}. Let ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. Following (Balasko, 2014, Sec. 4), we say that the
hyperplane A(ω) lies below the hyperplane A(ω′) for trader i if p · ωi < p · ω
′
i is satisfied for all
p ∈ S. It is clear that A(ω) lies below A(ω′) if and only if ωi  ω′i; see (Balasko, 2014, Lem. 2)
for a proof.
Now, we interpret the local equilibrium price selection map in Definition 3.2 using A(ω) and
B(r). If (p, ω) ∈ E is regular, then A(ω) and B(r) intersect transversally at (p, p · ω1, ·, p · ωn)
in the price-income space H(r). Then if ω′ ∈ Ω is sufficiently closed to ω, A(ω′)∩B(r) contains
a unique point in some small neighborhood of (p, p · ω1, · · · , p · ωn) ∈ H(r). Thus, in some
neighborhood of ω we obtain a map s : ω′ → (p(ω′), p · ω′1, · · · , p · ω
′
n) such that s(ω) = (p, p ·
ω1, · · · , p · ωn). Now composing this map with the projection (p(ω
′), p · ω′1, · · · , p · ω
′
n)→ p(ω
′)
gives the local equilibrium price selection map in Definition 3.2.
Theorem 6.1. A regular equilibrium (p, ω) features the transfer problem if and only if the
index of (p, ω) is −1. In particular, if (p, ω) is Walrus tatonnement locally stable, the transfer
problem does not arise.
Proof. Let (p, ω) ∈ E with b(p, ω) := (p, p ·ω1, · · · , p ·ωn) ∈ A(ω)∩B(r). Let ui(p, ω) = ui(p, p ·
ωi) for i ∈ {1, · · · , n−1}. Then M(u1(p, ω), · · · , un−1(p, ω)) = (p, p ·ω1, · · · , p ·ωn) ∈ H(r) (M
is defined in Section 5). Let ω = (0, 0, · · · , 0, r) ∈ Ω and ω = (r, 0, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ Ω. Set
t(ω) :=M(u1(0), · · · , un−1(0)),
t(ω) :=M(u1(r), · · · , un−1(0)).
Since B(r) is a smooth connected manifold and parametrized by u−n ∈ U(r), there exist curves
C1 (and C2) from t(ω) to b(p, ω) (and from b(p, ω) to t(ω) respectively) where points on C1
(those on C2) correspond to the utility level of trader 1 lower than or equal to u1(p, ω) (higher
than or equal to u1(p, ω) respectively).
If the intersection number of A(ω) and B(r) is −1 at b(p, ω), there exists a neighborhood
U ⊂ H(r) of b(p, ω) such that all points in U ∩ C1 is above A(ω) for trader 1. Likewise, all
points in U ∩C2 is below A(ω).
Let U ′ be an open neighborhood of ω where the local equilibrium price selection map
s : U ′ → P is defined. Without loss, we choose U ′ such that the image of the projection of U
onto Ω is contained in U . Then if ω′ ∈ U ′ and ω′1  ω1, A(ω
′) lies below A(ω) for trader 1. So
b(s(ω′), ω′) lies below A(ω) for trader 1. Then b(s(ω′), ω′) belongs to the curve C2. Thus we
have u1(f1(s(ω
′), s(ω′) · ω′1)) > u1(f1(s(ω), s(ω) · ω1)).
Similarly we can show that if the intersection number of A(ω) and B(r) is 1 at b(p, ω), then
u1(f1(s(ω
′), s(ω′) · ω′1)) < u1(f1(s(ω), s(ω) · ω1)) for ω
′ ∈ U ′ with ω′1 < ω1.
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Note: although the proof shows there exists the transfer problem which improve trader 1’s
utility level after he/she gives away some of his/her endowment, there is nothing special for
trader 1. A similar argument works for any trader i.
Remark 6.2. Suppose that we are at a no-trade equilibrium (p, ω) ∈ E. In (Balasko, 2011),
Balasko showed that the set of regular equilibria is partitioned into a finite number of path-
connected components and the index is constant in each component. Moreover he showed that
the set of no-trade equilibria is contained in the unique component of index 1. Therefore the
transfer problem arises only for a large amount of trades.
7 Open questions
Open Problem 7.1. Our model does not have a production sector. It would be interesting to
see how the result changes if we introduce a production sector into the model.
Open Problem 7.2. We have avoid the issue of trade costs. It is natural to ask: what happens
if we introduce various kinds of trade impediments? Some discussions are in (Samuelson, 1954).
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